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Abstract. From July the 29th to August the 3th, 2007, the Dagstuhl
Seminar 07311 Frontiers of Electronic Voting was held in the Interna-
tional Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During
the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and
ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the pre-
sentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results
and ideas are put together in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the
seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full
papers are provided, if available.
Keywords. Voting machine, remote voting, veriﬁability, foundations of
voting algorithms, attacks
07311 Executive Summary  Frontiers of Electronic Voting
This is a short report on Dagstuhl Seminar 07311 - Frontiers of Electronic Voting,
29.07.07 - 03.08.07, organized in The International Conference and Research
Center for Computer Science (IBFI, Schloss Dagstuhl).
Keywords: voting machine, remote voting, veriﬁability, foundations of voting
algorithms, attacks
Joint work of: David Chaum, Mirosªaw Kutyªowski, Ronald Rivest, Peter Y.
A. Ryan
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1294
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 07311
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Internet Voting in Estonia
Michael Alvarez (CalTech - Pasadena, USA)
A handful of countries have conducted Internet voting trials over the past decade,
including France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. All of these trials have been conducted at the local and regional
levels of government, targeting speciﬁc populations of voters. The nation that has
advanced the farthest with the deployment of Internet voting has been Estonia, a
former Soviet republic on the Baltic Sea and now a full member of the European
Union. Since 2000, Estonia has conducted two national elections in which all
voters could use Internet voting. The ﬁrst election, in October 2005, was for local
oﬃces and the second election, in March 2007, was for parliamentary elections
at the national level. In this paper, we discuss the context for the Estonian
experience in deploying Internet voting. We focus on the systematic way in which
the Estonians have addressed the legal and technical considerations required to
make Internet voting a functioning voting platform, as well as the political and
cultural framework that promoted this innovation. Using data from our own
qualitative and quantitative studies of the Estonian Internet voting process, we
then consider who voted over the Internet in these elections, how Internet voting
has been used in Estonian elections and the political implications of the voting
platform. Finally, we consider the lessons that other countries can learn from
the Estonian experience.
Keywords: Internet voting, remote voting, Estonia
Joint work of: Alvarez, R. Michael; Hall, Thad E.; Trechsel, Alexander H.
Using Incident Reports to Detect Election Anomalies and
Irregularities
Michael Alvarez (CalTech - Pasadena, USA)
In this paper we discuss the use of a novel form of data to develop threat assess-
ments for election administration and voting technology. In a primary election
on May 2006, Cuyahoga County (Ohio, USA) asked poll workers to complete
precinct incident report forms, and Cuyahoga County poll workers reported 6,285
incidents. The incident report forms were not elaborate. Other than asking for
average and longest voter wait times, they were essentially blank pieces of paper
on which poll workers wrote accounts of the problems they encountered. These
verbatim reports were entered into an electronic database, and then coded into
speciﬁc categories. We begin our analysis with a discussion of vulnerabilities of
electronic voting, then turn to a detailed analysis of the precinct incident report
data from the March 2006 Cuyahoga primary. We conclude with a discussion of
the utility these data for studying election fraud and anomalies, as well as for
the development of threat assessment models for voting technologies.
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Keywords: Threat assessment, risk analysis, precinct incidents
Joint work of: Kiewiet, D. Roderick; Hall, Thad E.; Alvarez, R. Michael; Katz,
Jonathan N.
Can Simple Electronic Voting Be Voter-Veriﬁable?
Josh Benaloh (Microsoft Research - Redmond, USA)
The technology for veriﬁable, open-audit elections has advanced substantially
since research on this topic began a quarter century ago. Many of the prob-
lems are well-understood and have solid solutions. Ballot casting assurance 
the problem of ensuring that a programmatically encrypted ballot matches the
intentions of an individual human voter  has recently been recognized as per-
haps the last substantial obstacle to making this technology fully viable. Several
clever schemes have been developed to engage humans in interactive proofs to
challenge and check validity of each ballot cast, but such a high standard may
be neither practical nor necessary. If done properly, substantial integrity can be
obtained by giving voters and observers the option to challenge ballot validity
without requiring all voters to do so. This option can be made unobtrusive so as
to not interfere with the normal process for most voters, but there are numerous
risks and subtleties that necessitate a careful examination of the process. This
presentation introduces a framework for voter-veriﬁability in electronic voting,
identiﬁes some heretofore unobserved issues with this simple method of cast-
ing ballots, and describes a detailed process that mitigates all known threats.
In doing so, it provides a blueprint for how veriﬁable, open-audit elections can
reasonably be conducted in practice.
Keywords: Voting, elections, voter-veriﬁable
Full Paper:
http://www.usenix.org/events/evt07/tech/tech.html
Excel Ate My Election!
Ian Brown (Oxford University, GB)
Elections held during May 2007 in England and Scotland for the ﬁrst time al-
lowed accredited observers access to polling stations and counts. This provided
an opportunity for detailed scrutiny of the use of e-voting and e-counting equip-
ment in these elections. This presentation will summarise observations from 10
constituencies and data obtained using Freedom of Information Act requests,
interviews with oﬃcials, candidates and parties and reports on previous trials.
We conclude that inadequate time was available during the procurement process
for cross-party consensus to be built around the English e-voting trials or for
systems to be fully tested. Design errors meant that a very large number of
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Scottish ballots were spoiled, while problems with ballot papers required a large
number of votes to be counted manually. Manual recounts found large discrep-
ancies with automated counts, with 56.1% more votes discovered by hand in the
Dereham-Humbletoft ward. Laptops used for voting and live electronic registers
in Swindon were unreliable, and a lack of usability testing meant that many
voters had diﬃculty using systems. In South Bucks these voters were prevented
from voting in person at a polling station, leaving them disenfranchised. Votes
initially missed due to an over-wide Excel spreadsheet changed the result in the
Highlands and Islands and handed a majority in the Scottish Parliament from
the Labour party to the Scottish National Party. These problems raise signiﬁcant
doubts over the outcomes of the May 2007 elections.
Joint work of: Kitcat, Jason; Brown, Ian
Civitas: A Secure Remote Voting System
Michael Clarkson (Cornell University, USA)
Civitas is the ﬁrst implementation of a coercion-resistant, universally veriﬁable,
remote voting scheme.
This paper describes the design of Civitas, details the cryptographic protocols
used in its construction, and illustrates how language-enforced information-ﬂow
security policies yield assurance in the implementation. The performance of Civ-
itas scales well in the number of voters and oﬀers reasonable tradeoﬀs between
time, cost, and security. These results suggest that secure electronic voting is
achievable.
The name of this system as presented at Dagstuhl was CIVS.
In August 2007, the name was changed to Civitas. For more information, see
the Civitas website at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/projects/civitas.
Keywords: Electronic voting, coercion resistance, voter registration, secure
bulletin boards, cryptographic protocols
Joint work of: Clarkson, Michael; Chong, Stephen; Myers, Andrew
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1296
Full Paper:
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/people/clarkson/papers/clarkson_civitas_tr.pdf
Information-Theoretic Model of Elections
Benjamin Hosp (George Washington University, USA)
We present an information-theoretic model of a voting system, consisting of (a)
deﬁnitions of the desirable qualities of integrity, privacy and veriﬁability, and (b)
quantitative measures of how close a system is to being perfect with respect to
each of the qualities.
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We describe the well-known trade-oﬀ between integrity and privacy in this
model, and deﬁnes a concept of weak privacy, which is traded oﬀ with system
veriﬁability. This is an extension of a talk from WOTE 2006, and contains some
new applications of the model and arguments for the model's applicability.
Keywords: Information-Theory, Elections, Measurement, Integrity, Privacy,
Veriﬁability
Joint work of: Hosp, Benjamin; Vora, Poorvi
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1298
The Proof of Vote
Catsumi Imamura (IEAv - São José dos Campos, BR)
Election is a complex environment that demands a careful global analysis to
design a system architecture. Voters should be identiﬁed but kept anonymous
regarding to their voting intention. Equipments adopted for collecting, register-
ing and counting the votes should be veriﬁed for integrity, consistency, security
and transparency by specialist, voters and candidates. And the proof of vote
should be set to convince all participants.
This talk addresses the proof of vote mechanism we adopted in Brazil during
the election systems maturity life cycle since 1996 elections.
Keywords: Voting machine, proof
Code Voting? A Simple Way to Prevent Automatic Vote
Manipulation at Voter's Computer
Rui Joaquim (Polytechnic Institute of Lisbon/INESC-ID - Lisboa, P)
One of the major problems that prevent the widespread of Internet voting is the
vulnerability of the voter's computer. A computer connected to the Internet is
exposed to virus, worms, spyware, malware and other threats that can endanger
the election's integrity. For instance, it is possible to write virus that changes
the voter's vote to one predeﬁned vote on election's day.
It is possible to write such a virus so that the voter wouldn't notice anything
wrong with the voting application. This attack is very frightening because it may
pass undetected. To prevent such attack it is necessary to prevent automatic vote
manipulation at voter's computer. Here we present Code Voting, a solution to
this problem that is simple enough to be successfully used by the voter and, at
the same time, allows the use of cryptographic voting protocols that protect the
integrity of the election at the server side of the voting application.
Keywords: Internet voting, automatic vote manipulation, privacy
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CodeVoting: Protecting Against Malicious Vote
Manipulation at the Voter's PC
Rui Joaquim (Polytechnic Institute of Lisbon/INESC-ID - Lisboa, P)
Voting in uncontrolled environments, such as the Internet comes with a price,
the price of having to trust in uncontrolled machines the collection of voter's
vote. An uncontrolled machine, e.g. the voter's PC, may be infected with a virus
or other malicious program that may try to change the voter's vote without her
knowledge. Here we present CodeVoting, a technique to create a secure commu-
nication channel to a smart card that prevents vote manipulation by the voter's
PC, while at the same time allows the use of any cryptographic voting protocol
to cast the vote.
Keywords: Internet voting, vote manipulation
Joint work of: Joaquim, Rui; Ribeiro, Carlos
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1299
Frontiers in Modern Veriﬁcation for e-Voting
Joseph R. Kiniry (University College - Dublin, IRL)
Constructing a modern e-voting application necessitates using best practices in
software engineering. The only way to achieve the system and software quality
level demanded by many researchers in the voting research community, and by
few individuals and groups in the public, is to use modern veriﬁcation technol-
ogy based upon applied formal methods. Recent advancements in veriﬁcation
theory and technology enable, for the ﬁrst time, the ability to formally design
and develop applications on the order of the size and complexity of modern
voting computers. This talk summarizes some of those advancements that are
particularly apropos to this problem domain, and highlights some of the open
research challenges in connecting the research in e-voting systems design to e-
voting systems engineering, from the point of view of an applied formal methods
researcher who also happens to be an e-voting activist, security analyst, and
system architect.
Keywords: Applied formal methods, e-voting, veriﬁcation, technology, tools
Introduction bullet points and questions/issues for seminar
Joseph R. Kiniry (University College - Dublin, IRL)
Joe Kiniry is a Lecturer in the School of Computer Science and Informatics
(http://www.csi.ucd.ie/) at University College Dublin (http://www.ucd.ie/) in
Dublin, Ireland.
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o He leads the KindSoftware Research Group (http://secure.ucd.ie/) and co-
founded and co-leads the Systems Research Group (http://srg.cs.ucd.ie/) which
consists of over 40 researchers in ﬁelds ranging from pervasive systems' soft-
ware and hardware (design, implementation, visualization, etc.) to applied for-
mal methods.
o While a Postdoctoral Scholar at Radboud University Nijmegen he led sev-
eral eﬀorts focusing on the security analysis of modern computing systems that
impact upon society including smart cards and e-voting systems.
o He led the (unauthorized by the Dutch government) security hack of the
Dutch remote voting system (KOA).
o He led the (authorized) external systems security analysis of the KOA
system.
o He was the core veriﬁcation expert in the design and development of the
(partially) formally veriﬁed KOA ballot count system.
o He has participated in various ways in the Irish Commission on Electronic
Voting (including assisting in the evaluation of the correctness of the PowerVote
software, being invited to and uninvited from various panels for asking the wrong
questions, etc.).
o He has led the design and development of a veriﬁed implementation of an
Irish STV-based ballot counting system.
o He leads the development of the GPL-based Open Source re-release of the
KOAv2 system.
o Questions/issues for the seminar: - Is e-voting a critical enough application
domain to warrant the use of software and hardware veriﬁcation? - If so, are
academic and volunteer e-voting researchers willing to learn and use the con-
cepts, tools, techniques, and process necessary to perform veriﬁcation. If not,
what quality level is necessary, how it is best achieved, and why is veriﬁcation
unimportant?
A Scientist's Guide to Talking with the Media
Joseph R. Kiniry (University College - Dublin, IRL)
The book that I suggested in Monday's panel session is called "A Scientist's
Guide to Talking with the Media" by Richard Hayes and Daniel Grossman. You
can order it from standard outlets such as Amazon, or, perhaps even better, you
can join the Union of Concerned Scientists (of which I am an active member) and
order it from them at a reduced rate. See http://www.ucsusa.org/publications/
scientist-media-guide.html for more details.
Keywords: Scientist, media, panel
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Remote Electronic Voting in Practise - A Review
Robert Krimmer (E-Voting.CC - Viennna, A)
Democracy and elections have more than 2,500 years of tradition. Technology has
always inﬂuenced and shaped the ways elections were held. Since the ermergence
of the Internet there has been the idea of conducting remote electronic elections.
In this paper we reviewed 104 elections with remote e-voting possibility based on
research articles, working papers and also press releases. Our ﬁndings show that
remote e-voting has arrived on the international stage, but in small numbers and
less sophisticated technology than expected.
Keywords: State of the Art, Technology, Elections
Kleptographic Attacks on E-Voting Schemes
Przemysªaw Kubiak (Institute of Mathematics & Informatics/TU Wroclaw, PL)
We analyze electronic voting schemes and show that in many cases it is quite easy
to implement a kleptographic channel, which is a profound danger for electronic
voting systems. We show serious problems with Neﬀ's scheme.
There are also attacks on Chaum's visual voting scheme and some related
schemes, which work at least when implementation is not careful enough.
Keywords: Kleptography, electronic voting, receipt voting, coercion, election
integrity, veriﬁable pseudo-randomness
Joint work of: Gogolewski, Marcin; Klonowski, Marek; Kubiak, Przemysªaw;
Kutyªowski, Mirosªaw; Lauks, Anna; Zagórski, Filip
Full Paper:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/p4702j7847312673/
Provable Unlinkability in Voting Processes
Mirosªaw Kutyªowski (Institute of Mathematics & Informatics/TU Wroclaw,
PL)
Multistage decryption and mixing of votes must be controlled in some way in
order to avoid dishonest vote counting.
Methods like radomized partial checking have been designed for this purpose.
We analyze mathematically how much information is revealed by such control
procedures and determine the number of mixes necessary to reach high level
security.
We also present some related results concerning ThreeBallot scheme.
Keywords: Anonymity, randomized partial checking, ThreeBallot
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Full Paper:
http://springerlink.metapress.com/content/x2ja9609xdgl/
See also: Rapid Mixing and Security of Chaum's Visual Electronic Voting,
Provable Anonymity for Networks of Mixes
Component Based Electronic Voting Systems
David Lundin (University of Surrey, GB)
An electronic voting system may be said to be composed by a number of com-
ponents, each of which has a number of properties. One of the most attractive
eﬀects of this way of thinking is that each component may have an attached
in-depth threat analysis and veriﬁcation strategy. Furthermore, the need to in-
clude the full system when making changes to a component is minimised and
a model at this level can be turned into a lower-level implementation model
where changes made can cascade to as few parts of the actual implementation
as possible.
Keywords: Component based electronic voting systems
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1300
Receipt-Free Universally-Veriﬁable Voting With
Everlasting Privacy
Tal Moran (Weizmann Inst. - Rehovot, IL)
We present the ﬁrst receipt-free voting scheme that gives voters "everlasting
privacy": even an adversary with unbounded computational power will be unable
to learn anything about the voters' votes (beyond what is revealed by the ﬁnal
tally). Our voting protocol is designed to be used in a traditional setting, in which
voters cast their ballots in a private voting booth. Following in the footsteps of
Chaum and Neﬀ, our protocol ensures that the integrity of an election cannot
be compromised even if the computers running it are all corrupt .
We present the protocol using physical metaphors (weights and scales), in a
way that can be understood even by people that do not have a computer-science
background.
Keywords: Voting, cryptographic, receipt-free, everlasting privacy
Joint work of: Moran, Tal; Naor, Moni
Full Paper:
http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/∼Etalm/
See also: Crypto 2006, LNCS vol. 4117, pg. 373-392
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Scantegrity
Stefan Popoveniuc (George Washington University, USA)
Scantegrity is an integrity assurance add-on for any conventional optical-scan
voting system. It gives voters the ability to verify that their votes are recorded
and tallied correctly without altering the basic form of the ballot or how voters
use it.
Scantegrity borrows its clockwork from the Punchscan voting system. But
instead of being a complete voting system, Scantegrity aims to provide a low-
footprint audit companion solution for any current optical scan voting system.
Its special audit symbols are included unobtrusively in the ballot printing, out
of the way of what voters need to do-vote.
Keywords: Optical scan voting, E2E
Full Paper:
http://scantegrity.org/papers/whitepaper.pdf
Verifying Electronic Voting Protocols in the Applied Pi
Calculus (5 minute talk)
Mark D. Ryan (University of Birmingham, GB)
This is a 5-minute advert for my talk, of the same title. I outline our approach
to veriﬁcation of voting protocol properties, and give the essential results.
Keywords: Automatic veriﬁcation
Joint work of: Ryan, Mark D.; Delaune, Stephanie; Kremer, Steve
Pret a Voter with Human-Readable Paper Audit Trail
Peter Ryan (University of Newcastle, GB)
The Prêt à Voter election scheme allows voters to conﬁrm that their vote is
accurately counted whilst maintaining ballot secrecy. Initial analysis indicates
that the scheme is highly trustworthy, due to the high degree of transparency
and auditability. However, the assurance arguments are subtle and involve some
understanding of the role of cryptography. As a result, there remain challenges
regarding public understanding and trust. It is essential that a voting system be
not only trustworthy but also widely trusted.
In this note, I propose a simple mechanism to generate a conventional paper
audit trail that can be invoked should the outcome of the cryptographic count
be called into question. It is hoped that having such a familiar mechanism as a
safety net will encourage public conﬁdence.
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Care has to be taken to ensure that the mechanism does not undermine the
carefully crafted integrity and privacy assurances of the original scheme.
Keywords: Veriﬁable voting, paper audit trail
On SVIS project
Kazue Sako (NEC - Kawasaki, J)
With the experince of developing a binding voting system based on mix-nets for
private organization with 17000 elgible voters and running it almost every other
months for more than 3 years, we're planning to provide a system for in academic
symposiums involving general participants. The ﬁrst target is Symposium on
Cryptography and Information Security (SCIS) which is an annual symposium
held in Japan collecting more than 600 participatants. There is SCIS award for
young researchers based on a paper-voting from participants. In the presentation
I will talk about our eﬀort in SVIS project (Secure Voting in Symposiums) to
bring a remote electronic voting system in the next SCIS in January 2008. I will
talk about a new privacy requirement in voting protocol which I faced in this
project and ideas to meet the requirement.
Client/Server Trade-Oﬀs in Universally Veriﬁable
Elections
Berry Schoenmakers (TU Eindhoven, NL)
Veriﬁable computation of the election result is commonly done by using either
homomorphic techniques or mixing techniques. Homomorphic tallying is fast
but the encrypted votes are accompanied by a noninteractive zeroknowledge
proof, which may be costly. Mix-based tallying allows for simple, constant-size
encrypted votes but sequential mixing and ﬁnal tallying are relatively slow.
In this talk we give a trade-oﬀ in which the work for the voting client is
minimized (same eﬀort as in mix-based case) and homomorphic tallying it still
possible. Thus, compared to Damgaard-Jurik's result (PKC '02), we reduce the
work even further by eliminating the interval proof needed in their case. By using
the protocol for binary conversion of Paillier encrypted values by Schoenmakers-
Tuyls (Eurocrypt '06), the servers can check the validity of any encrypted vote.
The transformation (incl. binary conversion) of the encrypted votes into suitably
homomorphically encrypted votes can be done during the election, possibly even
before acknowledging receipt of the vote to the voter. Once the election is closed,
the election result can be produced quickly using homomorphic tallying.
12 D. Chaum, M. Kutyªowski, R. L. Rivest and P. Ryan
Weighted Voronoi Region Algorithms for Political
Districting
Bruno Simeone (University of Rome "La Sapienza", I)
Automated political districting shares with electronic voting the aim of pre-
venting electoral manipulation and pursuing an impartial electoral mechanism.
Political districting can be modelled as multiobjective partitioning of a graph
into connected components, where population equality and compactness must
hold if a majority voting rule is adopted. This leads to the formulation of com-
binatorial optimization problems that are extremely hard to solve exactly. We
propose a class of heuristics, based on discrete weighted Voronoi regions, for
obtaining compact and balanced districts, and discuss some formal properties
of these algorithms. Their performance has been tested on randomly generated
rectangular grids, as well as on real-life benchmarks; for the latter instances the
resulting district maps are compared with the institutional ones adopted in the
Italian political elections from 1994 to 2001.
Keywords: Political districting, weighted Voronoi regions, graph partitioning,
heuristics
Joint work of: Simeone, Bruno; Ricca, Federica; Scozzari, Andrea
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1302
Coercion-Resistant Tallying for STV Voting
Vanessa Teague (University of Melbourne, AU)
There are many advantages to voting schemes where voters rank all candidates
in order, rather than just choosing their favourite. However, these schemes inher-
ently suﬀer from a coercion problem when there are many candidates, because a
coercer can demand a certain permutation from a voter and then check whether
that permutation appears during tallying. Existing coercion-resistant crypto-
graphic voting schemes do not address this problem. In this paper, we solve
this problem for the popular STV system, by constructing an algorithm for the
veriﬁable tallying of encrypted votes.
Keywords: Electronic voting, coercion, Italian attack, STV, preferential voting,
Australian voting
On Coercion-Resistant Electronic Schemes with Linear
Work
Jacques Traore (France Telecom R&D - Caen, F)
Remote electronic elections are a promising concept to aﬀord convenience to
voters and to increase election turnouts.
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Problems related to coercion and to vote-selling, though, impede the realiza-
tion of these elections in large scale. Recently, Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson
proposed a scheme that considers real-world threats and that is more realistic
for remote electronic elections. Their scheme, though, has quadratic work factors
and thereby is not eﬃcient for large elections. Based on the work of Juels et al.,
Smith proposed an eﬃcient scheme that has linear work factors. In this talk we
ﬁrst show that Smith's scheme is not coercion resistant. Then we present a new
coercion-resistant scheme with linear work factor that overcomes this and other
ﬂaws of the Smith' proposal. Our solution is based on a variant of Boneh, Boyen,
Sacham group signature scheme (Crypto´04).
Joint work of: Traore, Jacques; Araujo, Roberto; Foulle, Sébastien
A practical and secure coercion-resistant scheme for
remote elections
Jacques Traore (France Telecom R& D - Caen, F)
Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson (JCJ) proposed at WPES 2005 the ﬁrst scheme
that considers real-world threats and that is more realistic for remote elections.
Their scheme, though, has quadratic work factor and thereby is not eﬃcient
for large scale elections. Based on the work of JCJ, Smith proposed an eﬃcient
scheme that has linear work factor. In this paper we ﬁrst show that the Smith's
scheme is insecure. Then we present a new coercion-resistant election scheme
with linear work factor that overcomes this and other ﬂaws of the Smith's pro-
posal. Our solution is based on the group signature scheme of Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya (Crypto 2004).
Keywords: Election schemes, coercion-resistance, security
Joint work of: Araujo, Roberto; Foulle, Sebastien ; Traore, Jacques
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1295
Standardized Basic Requirements and Evaluation
Techniques for Remote Electronic Voting
Melanie Volkamer (Universität Passau, D)
In the past, election oﬃcials have invited security experts to check the e-voting
systems for vulnerabilities. In general, each group of experts used their own set
of requirements on diﬀerent levels of detail and the evaluation methods as well
as the evaluation depth varied a lot. This leads to judgments about e-voting
systems which are hardly comprehensible by third parties. Thus, standardized
requirements and evaluation procedures are essential to successfully introduce
electronic voting.
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This talk provides a solution based on the internationally agreed certiﬁcation
standard Common Criteria by presenting our Protection Proﬁle (PP) for remote
electronic voting. The Protection Proﬁle Project was supported by the German
Federal Oﬃce for Information Security (BSI) and discussed with the e-voting
expert round of the German scientiﬁc association of informatics (GI) and ex-
perts of other organisations including universities, ministries, administrations,
product developers and data protection authorities. The certiﬁed PP serves as
a contribution to the international community and can be used for certiﬁcation
of remote electronic voting systems in any country around the world that has
adopted the Common Criteria.
The developed Protection Proﬁle for remote electronic voting deﬁnes only
a basic set of required security requirements based on a couple of assumptions
which needs to be extended depending on the particular election the system
should be used for.
The talk will ﬁrst sketch the current situation, give a short introduction to
the CC, including the advantages compared to existing approaches to scrutinize
electronic voting system and proposes the Protection Proﬁle including its restric-
tions in the current version and the mainly discussed topics in the development
process.
Electronic Vote-Veriﬁcation Receipts
Poorvi Vora (George Washington University, USA)
Recently proposed voter-veriﬁable protocols provide encrypted paper receipts
to voters, who may later check that these receipts are in the electronic ballot
box. This paper describes an enhancement that allows the voter to electronically
transmit, from the polling booth, her encrypted receipt to an external veriﬁer
of her choice, who may perform the check on her behalf. It uses a short-lived
human-veriﬁable digital signature - whose security depends on the hardness of
an AI problem - to enable the voter, without access to trusted computation, to
be certain that the receipt has been securely deposited with the external veriﬁer.
This approach presents the advantage of being easily extensible for those with
visual disabilities.
Keywords: Human-veriﬁable, digital signature, voting
Joint work of: Vora, Poorvi; Simha, Rahul
Full Paper:
http://www.seas.gwu.edu/∼Epoorvi/CaptchasWOTE07.pdf
See also: initial version at WOTE 2007
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Casting Votes in the Auditorium
Dan Wallach (Rice University, USA)
In elections employing electronic voting machines, we have observed that poor
procedures, equipment failures, and honest mistakes pose a real threat to the ac-
curacy of the ﬁnal tally. The event logs kept by these machines can give auditors
clues as to the causes of anomalies and inconsistencies; however, each voting
machine is trusted to keep its own audit and ballot data, making the record
unreliable. If a machine is damaged, accidentally erased, or otherwise compro-
mised during the election, we have no way to detect tampering or loss of auditing
records and cast votes.
We see a need for voting systems in which event logs can serve as robust
forensic documents, describing a provable timeline of events leading up to and
transpiring on election day. To this end, we propose an auditing infrastructure
that draws on ideas from distributed systems and secure logging to provide a
veriﬁable, global picture of critical election-day events, one which can survive
individual machine malfunction or malice. Our system, the Auditorium, joins
the voting machines in a polling place together in a private broadcast network
in which all election events are logged redundantly by every machine.
Each event is irrevocably tied to the originating machine by a digital signa-
ture, and to earlier events from other machines via hash chaining.
In this paper we describe in detail how to conduct an election in the Audito-
rium. We demonstrate our system's robustness to benign failures and malicious
attacks, resulting in a believable audit trail and vote count, with acceptable
overhead for a network the size of a polling place.
Joint work of: Sandler, Daniel; Wallach, Dan
Full Paper:
http://www.usenix.org/events/evt07/tech/full_papers/sandler/sandler.pdf
See also: 2007 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Veriﬁable Internet Voting for Unsecure Platform
Filip Zagórski (Wroclaw University of Technology, PL)
We present a voter veriﬁable Internet voting scheme which provides anonymity
and eliminates the danger of vote selling even if the computer used by the voter
cannot be fully trusted.
The ballots cast remain anonymous - even the machine does not know the
choice of the voter. It makes no sense to buy votes - the voter can cheat the
buyer even if his machine cooperates with the buyer.
Nevertheless, the voter can verity that his vote has been counted.
Joint work of: Zagórski, Filip; Kutyªowski, Mirosªaw
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Simulation-Based Analysis of E2E Voting Systems
Olivier de Marneﬀe (University of Louvain, B)
End-to-end auditable voting systems are expected to guarantee very interesting,
and often sophisticated security properties, including correctness, privacy, fair-
ness, receipt-freeness, . . . However, for many well-known protocols, these prop-
erties have never been analyzed in a systematic way.
In this paper, we investigate the use of techniques from the simulation-based
security tradition for the analysis of these protocols, through a case-study on
the ThreeBallot protocol.
Our analysis shows that the ThreeBallot protocol fails to emulate some nat-
ural voting functionality, reﬂecting the lack of election fairness guarantee from
this protocol. Guided by the reasons that make our security proof fail, we pro-
pose a simple variant of the ThreeBallot protocol and show that this variant
emulates our functionality.
Keywords: UC framework, simulatability, security proof, ThreeBallot
Joint work of: de Marneﬀe, Olivier; Pereira, Olivier; Quisquater, Jean-Jacques
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1297
